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CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL TORT
LIABILITY AND THE COLLATERAL
SOURCE RULE
Kenneth G. Nellis*
INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court in 1961 abrogated the common
law doctrine of governmental immunity in the landmark case of
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District.' After a two year moratorium
period, during which time the legal and fiscal problems created
thereby were studied by the California Law Revision Commission,2
comprehensive legislation applicable to all public entities was en-
acted. This legislation is commonly known as the California Tort
Claims Act of 1963.8 The basic principle underlying this law is that
public entities may be held liable only if a statute declares them
liable, i.e., all common law or judicially declared forms of liability
are abolished.
4
In over five years of operation under the 1963 act, numerous
decisions interpreting it have been handed down. The first cases
were primarily concerned with the constitutionality and retroactivity
of the act.5 Without exception, the courts have upheld its validity
* A.B. 1950, College of William and Mary; J.D. 1953, University of Illinois. Mr.
Nellis is an attorney for the Department of Public Works of the State of California,
specializing in tort litigation. The views herein expressed are those of the author and
not necessarily those of the State of California or the Department of Public Works.
1 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). The Muskopi decision has received con-
siderable attention by legal commentators. See, e.g., Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems
of a Sovereign without Immunity, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1963) ; Note, Torts:
Governmental Immunity, 9 U.CiL.A.L. REV. 266 (1962); Note, Torts: Sovereign
Immunity: Scope of Doctrine Severely Limited in California, 49 CALU. L. REV. 400
(1961); Comment, Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability, 34 S. CAL. L. REV.
346 (1961). See also Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking
in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1963) ; and Van Alstyne, Governmental
Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 463 (1963).
2 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, effective September 15, 1961; 4 CAL. LAw REVISION
COMM'N REP., REC. & STUDIES 801 (1963); 5 'CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP., REC.
& STUDIES 1 (1963).
3 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, which enacted California Government Code sections
810-895.8, and Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, which enacted California Government Code
sections 900-978.8. Although the act has no official title, the supreme court has referred
to it as the 1963 Tort Claims Act in Johnson v. State, 69 A.C. 813, 447 P.2d 352
(1968) and Becker v. Johnston, 67 Cal. 2d 163, 430 P.2d 43 (1967).
4 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1966); Datil v. Los Angeles, 263 A.C.A. 717, 69
Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968) ; Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967).
5 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 45(a), p. 3288, provides: "This act applies retro-
actively to the full extent that it constitutionally can be so applied."
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and application to pending cases.6 Other decisions have since con-
strued the statutes imposing liability upon public entities7 as well as
the various statutes providing immunities and defenses. 8 The act is
without a doubt complicated and will be a source of much future
litigation.9
One of the most significant cases to be decided, surprisingly
enough, is not a tort case at all but a contract action. 0 That decision
is City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Company," which
holds that the collateral source rule 2 does not apply in actions
6 See, e.g., Cabell v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 430 P.2d 34 (1967) ; Heieck & Moran
v. Modesto, 64 Cal. 2d 229, 411 P.2d 105 (1966) ; County of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court, 62 Cal. 2d 839, 402 P.2d 868 (1965). For a full treatment of this subject, see
Nellis, Retroactivity of the z963 California Governmental Tort Law: A Legislative
Triumph, 1 Li coLN L. REV. 39 (1965).
7 There are four basic theories of liability imposed by the act. These statutes and
representative cases decided thereunder are as follows:
(a) CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966) (respondeat superior): Heieck & Moran
v. Modesto, 64 Cal. 2d 229, 411 P.2d 105 (1966) ;
(b) CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.4 (West 1966) (acts of independent contractor): Van
Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 437 P.2d 508 (1968) ;
(c) CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1966) (mandatory duty): Akins v. County of
Sonoma, 67 Cal. 2d 185, 430 P.2d 57 (1967) ;
(d) CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (West 1966) (dangerous conditions): Pfeifer v.
County of San Joaquin, 67 Cal. 2d 177, 430 P.2d 51 (1967).
8 There are so many immunities provided by the act that it is difficult to classify
them in any particular manner. Some of the more frequently encountered immunities
and representative cases decided thereunder are as follows:
(a) CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966) (discretionary immunity): McCorkle
v. Los Angeles, 70 A.C. 262, 449 P.2d 453 (1969) ; Johnson v. State, 69 A.C. 813, 447
P.2d 352 (1968);
(b) CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1966) (plan or design immunity): Becker v.
Johnston, 67 Cal. 2d 163, 430 P.2d 43 (1967); Cabell v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 430
P.2d 34 (1967) ;
(c) CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 850.2, 850.4 (West 1966) (fire protection immunities):
Heieck & Moran v. Modesto, 64 Cal. 2d 229, 411 P.2d 105 (1966) ;
(d) 'CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 854.8, 855.8, 856 (West 1966) (mental institution im-
munities): County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d 839, 402 P.2d 868
(1965) ; Loop v. State, 240 Cal. App. 2d 591, 49 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1966).
9 In Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 284, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312, 313 (1967), the
following description of the act is worthy of attention:
As stated in Muskopi v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, at page
219 [11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 4571: '[W]hen there is negligence, the rule is
liability, immunity is the exception.' The effect of the 1963 legislation, how-
ever, is to reverse the formula when a public entity or employee is charged.
By section 815 immunity becomes the rule, and we must look to the sections
of the act following that section for exceptions. There are many-but with
exceptions to the exceptions and exceptions to the exceptions to the exceptions,
and so it goes sometimes seemingly ad infinitum to the delight of legal scholars
and the despair of lawyers and judges.
10 By virtue of the express provisions of California Government Code section 814,
the act does not affect liability based on contract. See E. H. Morrill Co. v. State, 65
Cal. 2d 787, 423 P.2d 551 (1967).
11 66 Cal. 2d 217, 424 P.2d 921, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1967).
12 "The so-called 'collateral source rule' provides in effect that benefits received
by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer
will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." Annot., 7
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against public entities. Perhaps even more surprising is the fact that
this case has been, for the most part, either ignored or overlooked
by legal commentators and practicing attorneys.'" The purpose of
this article is to explore the ramifications of this decision, to discuss
its practical effect and operation in suits where a private person or
corporation is a codefendant with a public entity, and to speculate
as to the future of the rule in view of its real potential to limit the
amount of damages recoverable against public entities in tort actions.
CITY OF SALINAS V. SOUZA & McCuE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
The City of Salinas contracted with Souza & McCue Construc-
tion Company to construct a sewer line. When Souza allegedly
breached the contract, the city brought suit and also joined Souza's
surety and a supplier of products to Souza as defendants. The con-
tractor cross complained against the city, alleging misrepresentation
of soil conditions, and against the supplier, alleging guaranteed per-
formance of the product supplied and a promise to indemnify Souza
for any losses.
The trial court found for Souza against the city and all other
claims for relief were denied. On appeal, it was held that Souza's
damages were improperly determined because the city was not per-
mitted to discover and introduce evidence of a settlement between
Souza and the supplier in order to reduce the damages the city would
have to pay Souza.
The supreme court stated that the general rule in California
is: "When an injured party receives compensation for his losses
from a collateral source 'wholly independent of the tortfeasor,' such
payment generally does not preclude or reduce the damages to which
it is entitled from the wrongdoer.'
4
Then the court observed that the collateral source rule has
A.L.R.3d 519 (1966). The term in its orthodox sense was first used in Harding v.
Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536, 538 (1871).
The application of the collateral source rule to private persons has been exhaus-
tively reviewed and discussed with varying conclusions as to the validity of its under-
lying justification. Compare Maxwell, Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of
Damages, 46 MIN. L. REV. 669 (1962) with Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and
Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 'CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966) and Note, Unreason in
the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1964). See
also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 25.22 (1956).
13 The Souza case, as it will be referred to throughout this article, was the subject
of a brief note in 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1163 (1967) and in York, Remedies, 'CAL. LAW
1967, 298 (1968). On November 8, 1968, the author delivered an address on govern-
mental tort liability at the California Trial Lawyers 4th Annual Lake Tahoe Seminar.
The effect of the Souza case on the collateral source rule and public entities provoked
more comment and discussion than any other topic.
14 66 Cal. 2d 217, 226, 424 P.2d 921, 925, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 341 (1967).
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generally been applied in tort as distinguished from contract cases.
After pointing out that some authorities have also applied the rule
in contract cases where the breach was tortious in nature, the court
held: "It is not necessary, however, that we reach the issue of
whether the fraudulent breach of a contract in some settings would
justify the application of the collateral source rule as we are com-
pelled to conclude that the rule is not applicable against a public
entity . ... "I'
The basic rationale of this holding is that the collateral source
rule is punitive in nature, and since punitive damages cannot be
levied against a public entity,'6 the rule itself does not apply to
public entities. Thus, the court concluded: "As we cannot impose on
the city any measure of direct damages which are punitive in nature,
it necessarily follows that we are foreclosed from doing it by an in-
direct and collateral route."' 7
As noted above, the decision is surprising since it occurred in
a contract case even though its greatest impact will be in the area
of governmental tort liability. On the other hand, if Souza had been
a tort action, it would not have been necessary to deal with the col-
lateral source rule at all. The same end result could have been
reached by applying established law relating to payments made by
joint or concurrent tortfeasors.
It has long been settled in California that a partial satisfaction
of a liability by a joint or concurrent tortfeasor, whether before or
after judgment, will result in a pro tanto reduction of the liability
of the other tortfeasors."' In other words, there is no double recovery
for the same wrong and only one complete satisfaction is permissi-
ble.' Since Souza claimed in its cross-complaint that both the city
and the supplier were responsible for its damages, evidence that a
payment was made to Souza by the supplier would, under the above
principle of tort law, serve to reduce the city's liability correspond-
ingly.
It can be surmised that the supreme court seized upon the
opportunity presented by the Souza case to establish the inapplica-
bility of the collateral source rule to public entities in recognition
15 Id. at 227, 424 P.2d at 926, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (citations omitted).
16 CAL. GOV'T 'CODE § 818 (West 1966) provides: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294
of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and
by way of punishing the defendant."
17 66 Cal. 2d 217, 228, 424 P.2d 921, 927, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 343 (1967).
18 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 877 (West Supp. 1968); De Cruz v. Reid, 69 A.C. 221,
444 P.2d 342 (1968) ; Laurenzi v. Vranizan, 25 Cal. 2d 806, 155 P.2d 633 (1945).
lI 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW (7th ed. 1960) Torts § 390, at
1595.
[Vol. 9
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
that the issue might not be directly presented to it in a tort action.20
Be that as it may, the decision serves as another example to en-
courage attorneys to be bold in challenging the doctrine of stare
decisis in any case where prior decisions are either wrong on prin-
ciple or contrary to modern social or economic policy.
WHAT COLLATERAL SOURCES ARE DEDUCTIBLE?
As already stated, payments made to a plaintiff by one tort-
feasor reduce the liability of other joint or concurrent tortfeasors
without regard to the collateral source rule. Similarly, a defendant
is entitled to a credit or pro tanto reduction for payments made to
plaintiff by the defendant himself or by his insurance carrier, as
such payments are direct and not collateral sources.2 1
Aside from these non-collateral sources which emanate from
the wrongdoers, the most common benefits which a plaintiff may re-
ceive can be broadly classified as follows:22
1. Insurance Proceeds. Various types of insurance may be in-
volved, such as disability insurance (including accident, hospitaliza-
tion and income protection insurance), life insurance, and fire or
property insurance;
2. Employment Benefits. Plaintiff may receive salary or other
payments from his employer because of accumulated sick leave or
vacation time, or he may be entitled to a pension because of his
disability;
3. Gratuities. These may include services rendered or pay-
ments made by public or private charities, by an association of which
plaintiff is a member, or by other persons, such as plaintiff's em-
ployer, his relatives or friends;
4. Social Legislation Benefits. This group includes workmen's
compensation, social security and disability compensation under un-
employment laws.
20 Compare County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957)
(where a somewhat similar means was used to establish a new rule applicable in con-
demnation proceedings by making admissible on direct examination of an expert
witness evidence of sales prices paid for similar property). In his dissenting opinion inFaus, Justice Spence charged that the majority used ". . . a novel type of judicial
technique in reaching its conclusion . . . ." Id. at 681, 312 P.2d at 686.21 Turner v. Mannon, 236 Cal. App. 2d 134, 45 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1965); Dodds v.
Bucknum, 214 Cal. App. 2d 206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1963). This rule has been codified,
in part, in CAL. INS. CODE § 11583 (West Supp. 1968).
22 This classification is used in Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the Amer-
ican Law of Damages, 46 MIe. L. REv. 669 (1962).
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Are all of these collateral sources now deductible in actions
against California public entities? If not, which are deductible and
which are not? Although the Souza case does not directly answer
these questions, a strong argument can be made that compensation
or benefits of all types received by a plaintiff should be deducted
from any award of damages.
It is settled that in tort actions damages are ordinarily awarded
only for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff for his actual
loss.2" Thus, it was said in Valdez v. Taylor Automobile Company:
Where, from the nature and circumstances of the case, a rule may
be discovered by which adequate compensation may be accurately
measured, such a rule should be applied in actions of tort. A plaintiff
in a tort action is not, in being awarded damages, to be placed in a
better position than he would have been had the wrong not been 
done.24
Where a plaintiff has already been compensated in whole or in
part for his loss by collateral sources, to allow him to recover again
from the wrongdoer does place him in a better position than he
would have been had the wrong not been done, i.e., he gets a double
recovery. Traditionally, this double recovery has nevertheless been
permitted under the collateral source rule on the theory that the
wrongdoer should be required to pay as a punitive and preventive
measure. However valid the reasons may be for this policy,
25 the
Souza case clearly holds that it is not permissible where a public
entity is the defendant.26
What basis is there, then, for refusing to limit plaintiff's dam-
ages to the actual loss he has sustained by permitting a deduction
for all payments he has received from collateral sources?
27 It has
2 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1954); Crisci v. Security Ins. 'Co., 66 'Cal. 2d
425, 426 P.2d 173 (1967) ; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 901, comment a (1939)
id. § 903.
24 129 Cal. App. 2d 810, 821-22, 278 P.2d 91, 98 (1954). In this case, defendant
failed to obtain an automobile insurance policy on a used car he sold to plaintiff.
Plaintiff was involved in an accident and a judgment for $18,465 was rendered against
him. He recovered this amount against defendant even though the promised insurance
would only have paid a total of $8,465. On appeal, the judgment against defendant
was reduced to $8,465 since this was the actual detriment sustained by defendant's tort.
25 "This punitive damages theory has been described as a historical hangover
from the days when torts and crimes were administered by the same court and in the
same action." West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's Wind-
fall, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 395, 411-12 (1963). Legal commentators appear to be unan-
imous in agreeing that the refusal to mitigate damages to the extent of collateral
benefits in order to punish or deter the wrongdoer cannot be 'justified. See authorities
cited note 12 supra.
26 66 Cal. 2d 217, 228, 424 P.2d 921, 927, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 343 (1967).
27 In accordance with California Evidence Code section 351, all relevant evidence
is admissible except as otherwise provided by statute. Evidence of payments from
collateral sources is clearly relevant in this situation to mitigate plaintiff's damages,
[Vol. 9
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been suggested that disallowing a deduction may be justified where
plaintiff's loss has been met (1) out of resources that would other-
wise have been available to him for other purposes, and (2) by a
gift where the intention of the donor is that it shall be in addition
to all other recovery."8 Included in the first category are pensions
or annuities that are payable to plaintiff without regard to the dis-
ability, salary taken out of sick leave or vacation time that could
otherwise be accumulated, and life insurance. Compensation in these
situations, like a gift which is intended to be in addition to com-
pensation, is said not to be double in the true sense.29
Such a solution, allowing a deduction for some collateral pay-
ments but not for others, would have to be worked out on a case by
case basis, and it would present some difficult problems of proof,
particularly where gifts are involved. For example, suppose an em-
ployer voluntarily continues to pay plaintiff's salary during his dis-
ability. Should plaintiff nevertheless be allowed to recover for loss
of earnings if he can somehow prove that the employer actually
intended the gift to be in addition to what plaintiff might recover?
And should recovery be denied if this was not the intent or if the
intent of the donor was never thought out? Although complicated,
this is the present rule in some jurisdictions."
Permitting a deduction for all collateral sources would at least
provide a rule which is both logical and easy to apply. Thus, one
legal commentator has stated that "[i] f the task of reasoning through
to an answer appropriate to the kind of benefit involved is believed
too difficult, a general rule confining damages to a compensatory level
seems infinitely preferable to its opposite. . .. "I'
Some unique considerations are presented in the application of
the rule under discussion to wrongful death actions, as well as its
effect on the right of subrogation.
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
The statutory and exclusive measure of damages in wrongful
death actions in California is what the heirs were receiving at the
and no statute provides to the contrary. Compare CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 1100-56 (West
1966) (evidence affected or excluded by extrinsic policies).
28 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 25.22, at 1348 (1956). The authors conclude
that the wrongdoer should be allowed a deduction for resources which the plaintiff
has a right to receive, but only in the event of the loss caused by the tort, including
fire, collision and disability insurance, and benefits from welfare legislation.
2 Id. at 1348-49.
80 Id. at 1349 nn.28 & 29.
81 Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 741, 753 (1964).
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time of the death of the decedent, what the heirs would have re-
ceived had the decedent lived, and the monetary equivalent of loss
of comfort, society and protection. 2 The amount of damages is
determined in accordance with the various heirs' separate interests
in the deceased's life, and no recovery can be had by an heir who did
not sustain a pecuniary loss. 3
Does an heir actually sustain a pecuniary loss where he has
inherited assets from the deceased person which equal or exceed the
amount of his separate interest in the deceased's life? It appears that
he does not. Yet, the general rule rejects such evidence in wrongful
death actions. 4
The first case in California to consider this question was Mc-
Laughlin v. United Railroads.5 Plaintiffs were the children and
heirs of a widow who, at the time of her death, successfully operated
a drug store and also owned other income property. Defendant ad-
mitted liability for the wrongful death but sought to mitigate dam-
ages by offering evidence of the inventory and appraisement and
decree of final distribution in her estate.
The court pointed out that at common law no right of action
existed in favor of any one for wrongful death, and that such actions
originated in England by virtue of Lord Campbell's Act. The opinion
states:
The English courts adopted the broad view that whatever of prop-
erty the plaintiffs could be shown to have received through the death
was competent evidence for the consideration of the jury in their effort
to determine the amount of damage occasioned by the death. Thus, the
English courts held that if a father had nothing and earned nothing and
contributed nothing to the support of his family, the heirs' recovery
under the statute should be nominal; that if the father's income was
from fixed property, wholly independent of his own exertions, and this
property went to plaintiffs, this could be shown to lessen the amount
of the damages which might otherwise be awarded. Lord Campbell
instructed his jury that the amount of an accident policy which the
plaintiffs had received should be deducted from any award made to
them. He thought that deduction should also be made on account of a
regular life insurance policy .... 36
32 CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 377 (West Supp. 1967); Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 345, 57 'Cal. Rptr. 394 (1967); Stathos v. Lemich, 213 'Cal. App. 2d 52, 28
Cal. Rptr. 462 (1963) ; Cervantes v. Maco Gas Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 246, 2 Cal. Rptr.
75 (1960).
33 Cross v. Pacific Gas & EIec. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 690, 388 P.2d 353 (1964).
34 Stathos v. Lemich, 213 Cal. App. 2d 52, 28 'Cal. Rptr. 462 (1963) ; Cervantes
v. Maco Gas Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 246, 2 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1960); Wilson v. San Fran-
cisco, 106 Cal. App. 2d 440, 235 P.2d 81 (1951). It should be noted that the Wilson
case, in which the defendant was a public entity, was decided some 16 years before
the Souza case.
35 169 Cal. 494, 147 P. 149 (1915).
36 Id. at 496, 147 P. at 150.
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However, the court noted that a majority of courts in the
United States follow the diametrically opposite view and exclude all
such evidence for the reason that "[t]his rule of evidence has its
foundation in the refusal of the court to allow the defendant to
benefit by his own wrong, to lessen his responsibility in damages for
the injury which he has inflicted, by a showing that, quite fortuit-
ously, through no contribution of defendant's own, the plaintiffs
have received a certain pecuniary benefit."87
Thus, the evidence was excluded because of the collateral source
rule even though it was logically relevant on the issue of damages.
Since the Souza case has abolished the collateral source rule insofar
as public entities are concerned, it would appear to follow that all
such evidence should now be admitted to reduce plaintiff's damages. 8
It might be argued that the proceeds of decedent's estate, in-
cluding life insurance, should be excluded from consideration in
assessing damages since they are resources that would otherwise
have been available to plaintiff for other purposes.89 However, it is
highly speculative, that these proceeds, both as to the total amount
of the estate that might be accumulated and the proportionate share
that a particular heir might inherit, would ever be available to the
plaintiff if the decedent had lived. For these reasons, the California
rule is that no damages are recoverable for loss of an expected in-
heritance in a wrongful death action.4 0
Where an heir has actually received an inheritance from the
decedent, however, no speculation is involved. Under Souza, such an
inheritance is therefore relevant to determine the actual pecuniary
loss sustained by said heir.41
87 Id. at 498, 147 P. at 151.
88 The rule is also established in California that evidence of plaintiff's remarriage
is excluded in a wrongful death action. The underlying rationale is based, in part, on
the collateral source rule. See Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 57 Cal. Rptr.
394 (1967). This exclusionary rule was recently held applicable to a public entity in
Cherrigan v. San Francisco, 262 A.C.A. 698, 69 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1968). The opinion
cites and relies upon McLaughlin v. United Railroads, 169 Cal. 494, 147 P. 149 (1915),
but fails to cite or discuss the effect of the Souza case on the collateral source rule.
The result may nevertheless be justified on the basis that the amount of any deduction
would be difficult to compute since it is highly speculative to compare the prospective
earnings, services and contributions of the deceased spouse with those of the new
spouse.
39 See authority cited note 28 supra.
40 Burk v. Arcata & M.R.R.R. Co., 125 Cal. 364, 57 P. 1065 (1899); Bradford
v. Brock, 140 Cal. App. 47, 34 P.2d 1048 (1934). But see Griffey v. Pacific Elec. Ry.
Co., 58 Cal. App. 509, 209 P. 45 (1922).
41 This evidence may also be relevant on other issues. In Stathos v. Lemich, 213
Cal. App. 2d 52, 28 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1963), a copy of the inventory and appraisal of
decedent's estate was held admissible in evidence, not to reduce damages, but to rebut
the testimony of the heirs regarding expected large sum gifts from decedent.
1969]
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SUBROGATION RIGHTS
In abolishing the collateral source rule in actions against public
entities, did the Souza case also thereby preclude subrogation by a
third party who has compensated the plaintiff? Obviously, there is
no double recovery in this situation since the plaintiff recovers only
from the third party and the latter then recovers from the public
entity. The answer to this question depends upon a number of factors.
Initially, it is important to observe that there is no right of sub-
rogation in California in actions for personal injuries or wrongful
death, except where such right has been expressly granted by stat-
ute. 2 Therefore, the effect of Souza upon subrogation is limited to
those cases where a right of subrogation is otherwise recognized
under general law or where a specific statute controls. The most
common situations are an insurer's right of equitable subrogation
for property damages,43 and an employer's or his insurer's statutory
right of subrogation for workmen's compensation benefits. 4 The
first problem to consider is whether public entities may be liable in
such subrogation actions, without regard to the Souza case.
As pointed out above, California public entities are not liable in
tort except as provided by statute and all common law and judicially
declared forms of liability have been abolished. 5 Since an insurer's
right of subrogation for property damages is an equitable non-stat-
utory cause of action, it is questionable whether public entities are
liable for subrogation in such cases.4"
On the other hand, California Labor Code section 3852 does
provide for subrogation against any "person" other than the em-
ployer for workmen's compensation benefits. Although the word(person" in a statute does not ordinarily include public entities
where such a construction would infringe upon sovereign govern-
mental powers,47 California Labor Code section 3210 defines "per-
son? as including public and quasi-public corporations. 8
42 CAL. PROB. 'CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1968); Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal.
2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960); Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d
610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963); cf. Block v. California Physicians' Serv., 244 Cal. App.
2d 266, 53 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1966).
43 Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 228 P. 11 (1924); Patent Scaffolding
Co. v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 64 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1967).
44 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852 (West 1955) ; CAL. INS. CODE § 11662 (West 1955).
45 See authorities cited note 4 supra.
46 See cases cited note 43 supra. There is no statute which makes public entities
liable for subrogation in property damage actions.
47 Compare Flournoy v. State, 57 Cal. 2d 497, 370 P.2d 331 (1962).
48 This definition of "person" does not appear to include the State of California
itself or counties since neither are properly classified as public corporations. See, e.g.,
Vagim v. Board of Supervisors, 230 Cal. App. 2d 286, 40 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1964) ; see
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Assuming for purposes of discussion that public entities can
otherwise be liable in subrogation actions,49 does the Souza case
change this result? If the reason for the decision is merely to prevent
a double recovery by plaintiff himself, then subrogation actions are
probably not barred thereby.50 But the rationale of Souza is not so
limited. Rather, its avowed purpose is to prevent the levying of
punitive damages upon public entities, either directly or indirectly.5'
It appears that permitting subrogation against a public entity
is an indirect way of imposing punitive damages. An analogous sit-
uation arose in Patent Scaffolding Company v. William Simpson
Construction Company.52 The question was whether an insurer who
compensated Patent for a fire loss was subrogated to Patent's cause
of action against Simpson, a general contractor who had breached a,
contractual duty to either indemnify Patent for fire losses or to
procure fire insurance for Patent's benefit.
The court pointed out that a necessary element for equitable
subrogation is that justice requires that the loss be shifted and that
the equitable position of the party to be charged is inferior to that of
also Bettencourt v. I.A:C., 175 Cal. 559, 166 P. 323 (1917). Compare the much broader
definition of "public entity" contained in California Government Code section 811.2.
The only two cases discovered which involve subrogation against public entities for
workmen's compensaton ,benefits are Sacramento v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. App. 2d
398, 23 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1962), and Paolini v. San Francisco, 72 Cal. App. 2d 579, 164
P.2d 916 (1946). The application of California Labor Code section 3852 to public
entities is not discussed as an issue in either case. Moreover, both cases involved cities,
which are considered to be public corporations. See Blum v. San Francisco, 200 Cal.
App. 2d 639, 19 'Cal. Rptr. 574 (1962).
49 It should be noted that, apart from the question of whether public entities
may be substantively liable in subrogation actions, certain procedural requirements
are applicable. California Government Code sections 905 and 905.2 specify that claims
for money or damages must be presented to the State and local public entities, and
section 910 requires that such claims be presented by the claimant or a person acting
on his behalf. This would appear to require a claim to be filed by the subrogee in
addition to the claim filed by the injured party (subrogor). See Limited Mut. Comp.
Ins. Co. v. Billings, 74 Cal. App. 2d 881, 169 P.2d 673 (1946), and Los Angeles v.
Howard, 80 Cal. App. 2d 728, 182 P.2d 278 (1947) (wherein the right of subrogation
under California Labor Code section 3852 was held to be a separate and distinct cause
of action from the right of action of the injured employee); see also Fidelity & Cas.
Co. v. McMurry, 217 Cal. App. 2d 767, 32 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1963) (holding that a
workmen's compensation insurance carrier is barred by the failure to file a timely
claim against an estate under California Probate Code section 707).
50 See, e.g., Smith v. Trapp, 249 Cal. App. 2d 929, 58 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1967)
(where it is said that California Labor Code section 3852 should not be construed to
provide for double recovery). On the other hand, it has been said that the reason for
allowing subrogation is to prevent the plaintiff from making a double recovery. W.
VANCE, INSURANCE 104, 790 (3d ed. 1951). Since the Souza case precludes that possi-
bility, it is arguable that subrogration should not be allowed against public entities
for this reason. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510 (West 1954) provides: "When the reason of a
rule ceases, so should the rule itself."
51 See notes 16 and 17 supra, and accompanying text.
52 256 'Cal. App. 2d 506, 64 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1967).
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the subrogee.5" Where the party to be charged actually causes the
loss, subrogation is proper. But since the loss involved was caused
by the fire, not by the failure to procure fire insurance, it was held
that subrogation must be denied, the court stating:
Upon the facts in this case no public policy is perceivably served
by shifting the entire loss from the insurers to Simpson. The shifting of
loss is not a deterrent to wrongdoing, as it may be in cases permitting
subrogation against a tortfeasor. (City of Salinas v. Sousa & McCue
Constr. Co., Inc., supra, 66 Cal. 2d at p. 227.) Imposition of the loss upon
Simpson would be punitive, and punishment is not the objective of con-
tractual damages. (City of Salinas v. Sousa & McCue Constr. Co., Inc.,
supra; see also United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., supra,
223 F. 2d at p. 54; In re Future Mfg. Coop., Inc., supra, 165 F. Supp.
111, 113.) If subrogation were permitted, the insurers who have ac-
cepted premiums to cover the very loss which occurred receive a
windfall .... 54
The same reasoning would preclude subrogation against public
entities in tort actions. As pointed out in the Souza case, a public
entity necessarily acts through public officials and representatives.
Where a tort is committed by one of the latter and an action is
brought against the public entity, the loss falls upon innocent tax-
payers rather than on the actual wrongdoer. 5 Since the party to be
charged has not caused the loss where a public entity is the defend-
ant, no public policy is served by allowing subrogation. 6
METHOD OF ALLOWING THE CREDIT FOR
PAYMENTS FROM COLLATERAL SOURCES
The proper method of allowing the credit for payments from
collateral sources was not answered by the Souza case. The issue is
whether it should be (lone by the jury in assessing damages or by the
court after the plaintiff's total damages have first been determined
by the jury.
Relevant authority for the solution to this problem may be
found in the California cases relating to the manner of allowing
credit for an amount paid by one tortfeasor in an action by plaintiff
against another tortfeasor. In Steele v. Hash,57 the trial court in-
structed the jury that a codefendant had paid plaintiff two thousand
53 Id. at 509, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
54 Id. at 515-16, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
55 66 Cal. 2d 217, 228, 424 P.2d 921, 926, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 (1967).
56 In 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 25.23 (1956), the authors conclude that
where a claimant has been compensated from collateral sources, the interests of society
will generally be served best by denying subrogation. One of the reasons advanced is
that subrogation is an inappropriate weapon for punishment.
57 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 27 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1963).
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dollars in settlement, and that this amount should be deducted by
the jury from the verdict, if the jury found for the plaintiff. Plain-
tiff contended that this procedure was error on the ground that the
jury might conclude that plaintiff, having already received compensa-
tion which he must have regarded as adequate, is not entitled to
further damages. The court rejected this argument, stating:
[A]ppellant's contention that the court ought to have treated the
question of a prior settlement or release as a question of law finds no
support in the authorities. Appellant has been unable to cite one decision
indicating that a trial court is empowered to withhold certain evidence
from the jury, allow them to arrive at a verdict, and thereafter reduce
the verdict on the basis of evidence which the jury was not permitted
to consider. To the contrary, the California cases have repeatedly stated
that the question is one for the jury .... r8
However, a subsequent decision in Cseri v. D'Amore"9 held
that it was not prejudicial error to refuse to admit evidence of a set-
tlement where the court made the deduction after the jury verdict.
Steele v. Hash and other cases were distinguished on the ground that
they only decided that it was not error to submit the issue to the
jury. It can be seen from the language quoted above that Steele
actually decided more than that. The opinion clearly states that the
trial court is not empowered to withhold such evidence from the
jury.60
There is also a conflict of authority in other states as to how
this problem should be handled.6' Some cases hold that the credit
is to be given by the jury and not by the court, while other cases
hold that the matter is for the jury only where there are questions
of fact to be determined. 2 The parties may, of course, stipulate to
either procedure.
Payments from collateral sources, unlike a settlement with an-
other tortfeasor, ordinarily compensate plaintiff for his special dam-
ages only. Since juries often fix the amount of general damages in
58 Id. at 3-4, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 854. The Steele case was followed in Hanley v.
Lund, 218 Cal. App. 2d 633, 32 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1963), where the defendant complained
that he was prejudiced by this procedure. The same procedure was also approved in
Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963),
although Steele was not cited therein. It is interesting to notice that cases involving
payments from collateral sources were distinguished in Wyeth on the ground that
such payments are not admissible in evidence.
59 232 Cal. App. 2d 622, 43 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1965).
60 The Steele case also cited and quoted from Wiley v. Easter, 203 Cal. App. 2d
845, 21 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1962), stating that the jury "had a right to know" of such
payments made by another tortfeasor. The holding in Cseri v. D'Amore, 232 Cal. App.
2d 622, 43 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1965), was questioned in Granville v. Parsons, 259 A.C.A.
302 n.4, 66 Cal. Rptr. 149 n.4 (1968).
61 Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 352 (1964).
02 Id. at 360-89.
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accordance with some ratio to the special damages, it would appear
that the jury has a right to know the net amount of plaintiff's spe-
cial damages, i.e., the extent to which the special damages have been
paid by collateral sources.6
The mechanics of allowing the credit for collateral payments
become rather complex when a public entity is a codefendant with
one or more private defendants, as discussed hereinafter. Therefore,
it would appear advisable to instruct the jury that plaintiff has
received certain sums in a specified amount from collateral sources;
that the public entity defendant is entitled to a credit for these pay-
ments; but that the jury should determine the full amount of the
plaintiff's damages, leaving the deduction for the collateral pay-
ments to the court. The verdict form itself should recite that the
damages represent the total or gross damages without any deduction
for payments from collateral sources. In this way, the verdict will
not be ambiguous, the trial court will be able to give the credit to
the public entity, and a proper judgment can be entered on the
verdict. 4
MECHANICS OF ALLOWING THE CREDIT FOR PAYMENTS FROM
COLLATERAL SOURCES, DIRECT SOURCES, AND
OTHER TORTFEASORS
The problems involved and the proper solutions thereto can best
be illustrated by using a number of examples of typical situations
which may be expected to arise in practice.
Example 1. Plaintiff sues a public entity and proves damages
in a total amount of $50,000. The public entity introduces evidence
that plaintiff has received $10,000 from collateral sources. In this
63 The contention of plaintiff that admitting evidence of compensation from col-
lateral sources was prejudicial, as a matter of law, was rejected in Garfield v. Russell,
251 Cal. App. 2d 275, 59 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1967). The evidence was not offered to reduce
plaintiff's damages but as affecting her credibility as a witness, the court stating:
Evidence that a plaintiff is being wholly or partially compensated for her
medical expenses-or perhaps even making money every time she sees her
doctor-may obviously be relevant on her motives in seeking medical help and
her credibility as a witness, even if only remotely. . . . Id. at 278, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 381.
64 CAL. CODE CIV. PR0C. § 664 (West Supp. 1968). Compare Woodcock v. Fontana
Scaffolding & Equip. Co., 69 A.C. 467, 445 P.2d 881 (1968). The jury's verdict found
that both the defendant and plaintiff's employer were negligent and assessed damages
in the sum of $13,000. Relying on Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641 (1961),
the court held that the employer was not entitled to recover for workmen's compen-
sation benefits paid plaintiff in the amount of $4,311.76, and that the defendant was
entitled to a credit in that amount. However, the verdict was ambiguous in not
specifying whether the $13,000 was the gross or net amount of damages. The supreme
court interpreted the verdict in light of the pleadings, evidence and instructions, hold-
ing that the $13,000 was a gross amount, and the judgment was ordered reduced to
$8,688.24.
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simple case, the court may either instruct the jury to deduct $10,000
and return a verdict for the net amount of damages ($40,000), or
the court may instruct the jury to determine the full amount of
plaintiff's damages and thereafter make the deduction itself. In
either case, a judgment is entered for $40,000.
Example 2. Assume the same facts as in the above example
except that the public entity introduces evidence that plaintiff has
also received $5,000 in settlement from another tortfeasor. Here
again, either the jury or the court may make the deduction of
$15,000 and a judgment is entered for $35,000.
Example 3. Plaintiff sues a public entity and defendant, a
private person, and proves damages in a total amount of $50,000.
The public entity introduces evidence that plaintiff has received
$10,000 from collateral sources. The court instructs the jury regard-
ing the amount of the collateral source but requires the jury to deter-
mine the full amount of plaintiff's damages in a single verdict against
both defendants. The judgment entered on the verdict will be in the
amount of $50,000, and should recite that the liability of the public
entity is limited to $40,000 in order to give effect to the credit of
$10,000 received by plaintiff from collateral sources.65
Applying the statutory rule of contribution among joint tort-
feasors, the public entity would be entitled to recover $20,000 from
defendant after it has discharged the joint judgment of $40,000.66
Plaintiff would be required to recover the balance of his judgment,
i.e., $10,000, directly from defendant.6 7
Example 4. Plaintiff sues a public entity and defendant 1 and
defendant 2, both private defendants, and proves damages in a total
amount of $50,000. The public entity introduces evidence that plain-
tiff has received $10,000 from collateral sources not including the
65 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 578 (West 1955). This is essentially the same procedure
employed in tort actions against the owner and operator of a vehicle where the liability
of the owner is limited by California Vehicle Code section 17151. In such cases, one
verdict should be rendered in a single sum, and the statutory limitation of liability
applicable to the owner is incorporated in the judgment entered on the verdict.
Aynes v. Winans, 33 Cal. 2d 206, 200 P.2d 533 (1948); Sparks v. Berntsen, 19 Cal.
2d 308, 121 P.2d 497 (1942); Westcott v. Hamilton, 202 Cal. App. 2d 261, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 677 (1962) ; Harbor Ins. Co. v. Paulson, 135 Cal. App. 2d 22, 286 P.2d 870
(1955); see also Mixon v. Riverview Hosp., 254 Cal. App. 2d 364, 62 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1967), reviewing numerous cases involving separate verdicts against joint tortfeasors.
66 CAL. CODE Cirv. PROC. §§ 875-80 (West Supp. 1968). This statutory system for
contribution may be enforced only after entry of judgment and where one tortfeasor
discharges the joint liability or has paid more than his pro rata share. Augustus v.
Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 873 (1961).
67 The end result of this example is that plaintiff receives a total of $50,000, of
which amount the public entity pays $20,000 and the private defendant pays $30,000.
In this way, the public entity but not the private defendant receives the advantage of
the credit of $10,000 received by plaintiff from collateral sources.
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amount of $1,000 which defendant 1 establishes that plaintiff has
received from defendant l's insurance carrier. The court instructs
the jury regarding the $11,000 already received by plaintiff but re-
quires the jury to determine the full amount of plaintiff's damages
in a single verdict against all three defendants. The judgment entered
on the verdict will be in the amount of $50,000, and should recite
that the liability of the public entity is limited to $39,000 in order to
give effect to the credit of $11,000 received by plaintiff from col-
lateral sources. In addition, the judgment should recite that defen-
dant 1 has already discharged the judgment to the extent of $1,000,
the amount paid to plaintiff by defendant l's insurance carrier.68
Applying the statutory rules of contribution as in the last ex-
ample, the public entity would be entitled to recover $13,000 each
from defendant 1 and defendant 2 after paying plaintiff the $39,000
joint judgment. Plaintiff would then be required to recover the bal-
ance of his judgment, i.e., $11,000, from defendant 1 and defendant
2. Since this amount is also subject to contribution, defendant 1 and
defendant 2 would each owe one half thereof or $5,500, with defen-
dant 1 being entitled to a credit for the $1,000 already paid to plain-
tiff by his insurance carrier.69
Example 5. Assume the same facts as in example 4 except
that plaintiff also received before trial a settlement in the amount
of $3,000 from defendant 3, another private tortfeasor. The court
instructs the jury regarding the $11,000 from collateral sources as
well as the $3,000 from defendant 3 but the jury is required to deter-
mine the full amount of plaintiff's damages in a single verdict against
the public entity, defendant 1 and defendant 2. The judgment en-
tered on the $50,000 verdict will be in the amount of $47,000, to give
credit to the $3,000 settlement already received by plaintiff from
defendant 3.70 The judgment should recite that the liability of the
public entity is limited to $36,000 ($47,000 less $11,000) and that
defendant 1 has discharged the judgment to the extent of $1,000.
Under the contribution statute, the public entity would be en-
titled to recover $12,000 each from defendant 1 and defendant 2
68 The $1,000 paid by defendant l's insurance carrier is a collateral source
insofar as the public entity and defendant 2 are concerned. Defendant 2 is not entitled
to credit for it because of the collateral source rule, but the public entity is entitled to
credit under the Souza case. Defendant 1 is also entitled to credit for this amount
because it is a direct payment to plaintiff by his insurance carrier and not a collateral
source as to defendant 1. CAL. INS. CODE 1§ 11583 (West Supp. 1968).
69 The end result of this example is that plaintiff receives a total of $50,000, as
follows: $13,000 from the public entity; $18,500 from defendant 2 ($13,000 plus
$5,500) ; and $18,500 from defendant 1 ($13,000 plus $4,500 under the judgment plus
$1,000 from defendant l's insurance carrier).
70 Note that the public entity as well as defendant 1 and defendant 2 are entitled
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after discharging the joint judgment of $36,000. Plaintiff would be
required to recover the $11,000 balance from defendant 1 and def en-
dant 2 as in example 4.71
CONCLUSION
The decision of the supreme court in City of Salinas v. Souza
& McCue Construction Company has provided a potent weapon in
the arsenal of defenses available to public entities in tort litigation.
In abolishing the collateral source rule, the door has apparently been
opened for public entities to mitigate damages by introducing evi-
dence of and obtaining a credit for all payments received by plain-
tiff from collateral sources. The new rule would appear to be appli-
cable to compensation or benefits of any kind, including insurance,
employment benefits, gratuities and social legislation benefits. Even
the proceeds of the decedent's estate may be deductible in wrongful
death actions.
In addition to precluding the possibility of a double recovery
by plaintiffs, the Souza case has its impact upon other persons as
well. Subrogation actions against public entities appear to be barred
since the shifting of the loss from an insurer to innocent taxpayers is
essentially punitive in nature. Other private tortfeasors are also
affected as the allowance of the credit to the public entity necessarily
results in an increase in their pro rata share of the entire judgment.
It appears probable that the legislature will act in order to
clarify the law and specify the extent to which a plaintiff's damages
may be mitigated because of the receipt of compensation or benefits
from collateral sources. The California Law Revision Commission,
as a part of its authorization to study the doctrine of governmental
immunity,72 has recently determined to review the impact of the
Souza case with a view to submitting recommendations to the legis-
lature.73
Pending the enactment of such legislation, attorneys and trial
judges must endeavor to work out solutions to problems within the
framework of the Souza case. It may well be that, in the interim,
further clarification will be forthcoming from the appellate courts.
to credit for the amount of the settlement made by plaintiff and defendant 3. CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 877 (West Supp. 1968). Therefore, as in example 2, the judgment
entered on the verdict is reduced accordingly.
71 The end result of this example is that plaintiff receives $50,000, as follows:
$12,000 from the public entity; $17,500 from defendant 2 ($12,000 plus $5,500);
$17,500 from defendant 1 ($12,000 plus $4,500 under the judgment plus $1,000 from
defendant l's insurance carrier) ; and $3,000 from defendant 3 by way of a settlement.
72 Cal. Stats. 1957, Resolution ch. 202.
73 Minutes of the Cal. Law Revision Comm'n for January 9, 10 and 11, 1969.
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